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Iceland and European Union Accession - the Whaling Issue * 
 
On July 17, 2009, Iceland, a country that for some time has enjoyed close links 
with the European Union (―EU‖ or ―Union‖),1 made a formal application to join the EU; 
the response of the Council of the EU (―Council‖) was to ask the European Commission 
(―Commission‖) to deliver an opinion on the application.  This opinion was duly 
submitted to the Council and the European Parliament (―Parliament‖) on February 24, 
2010. Taking into account inter alia Iceland‘s democratic traditions, its application of the 
rule of law and regard for human rights, and its involvement in the single market since 
joining the European Economic Area (EEA),
2
 the Commission‘s opinion noted: 
 
Iceland‘s accession would have a limited overall impact on the European 
Union and would not affect the Union‘s capacity to maintain and deepen 
its own development. In the light of these considerations, the Commission 
recommends that negotiations for access to the European Union should be 
opened with Iceland.
3
 
 
Consequently, the EU member states‘ heads of state or government decided on June 17, 
2010 to open accession negotiations. These negotiations subsequently began on July 27, 
2010 in an intergovernmental conference held in Brussels.  
An essential focus of the Commission‘s opinion on Iceland‘s application was the 
ability of Iceland to take on the ―obligations of membership, i.e. the total body of EU 
legislation as expressed in the Treaty, the secondary legislation, as well as the policies of 
the Union (acquis of the European Union).‖4 Specifically in relation to EU environmental 
law, in February 2010, the Commission took the view that the ―[environmental] 
legislative framework in Iceland is to a large extent aligned with the acquis and should be 
able to take on the obligations of membership.‖5 However, in a word of warning as to 
Icelandic whaling operations, the Commission stipulated that ―further efforts will be 
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 Iceland has ―a high degree of integration with the EU through its membership of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) since 1994, as well as the Schengen area, which allows its citizens to travel and work freely 
throughout the EU.‖ Iceland - EU-Iceland Relations, EUROPEAN COMM‘N, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
potential-candidates/iceland/relation/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2010). 
2
 Commission Staff Working Document—Analytical Report Accompanying the Commission Opinion on 
Iceland's Application for Membership of the European Union, at 7, 9, 16, SEC (2010) 153 (Feb. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter Commission Analytical Report].  The EU is a key trading partner for Iceland. ―[M]ore than 
54% of Iceland‘s imports came from the EU and 76% of its exports went to the EU‖ in the year 2008. Id. at 
8. 
3
 Commission Staff Working Document—Commission Opinion on Iceland’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union, at 8, COM (2010) 62 (Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Opinion on Iceland’s 
Application]. 
4
 Commission Analytical Report, supra note 2, at 8.  
5
 Id. at 62. 
needed to achieve compliance with the nature protection acquis in particular as regards 
the protection of whales.‖6 
This article seeks to assess one of the important questions regarding Iceland‘s 
potential accession to the EU, namely, whether Iceland could legitimately continue its 
whaling operations under current EU environmental law if it becomes a member of the 
regional economic integration organization. Although it will be very politically difficult 
for Iceland to continue whaling as an EU member state, this article suggests it may be 
legally possible to whale in EU waters under current EU environmental law should 
Iceland make an appropriate derogation under the EU‘s Habitats Directive. However, the 
appropriateness of such derogation will be for the Commission, and perhaps ultimately 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), to decide.  
Before analyzing relevant EU environmental law, this article will provide an 
overview of key international developments in the last thirty years under the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (―Whaling Convention‖)7 and 
their application to Iceland, as well as an indication of the EU‘s stance in recent 
negotiations on the future of the IWC.
8
 
 
The Whaling Convention and Iceland 
 
Since World War II, the Whaling Convention has been the key international 
instrument regulating the harvesting of whales and the whaling industry. It aims to 
―provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly 
development of the whaling industry.‖9 The Whaling Convention established the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC),
10
 a body that meets annually to adopt 
regulations that are noted in the Schedule to the Treaty.
11
 There are presently eighty-nine 
parties to the Whaling Convention, each of whom is represented on the IWC by one 
commissioner. Although the EU is party to an increasing number of international 
environmental conventions
12
 and twenty-five of its twenty-seven member states have 
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 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 
[hereinafter ICRW]. The Whaling Convention was signed on December 2, 1946 in Washington, D.C. and 
entered into force on November 10, 1948. Two earlier attempts had proved unsuccessful in establishing an 
effective system of regulation. The Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 155 
L.N.T.S. 349, came into force on January 16, 1935, but failed to attract key whaling nations such as 
Argentina, Chile, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union as parties. The International Agreement for the 
Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 79, as amended by the 1938 Protocol, June 24, 1938, 
196 L.N.T.S. 131 and 1945 Protocol, Nov. 26, 1945, 148 U.N.T.S. 114, was not ratified by Japan and did 
little to curb the over-exploitation of the resource. See PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF 
WHALE-WATCHING 125-26 (1985).  See generally MICHAEL BOWMAN ET AL., LYSTER‘S INTERNATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW,150-198 (2d ed. 2010) (overview of the Whaling Convention). 
8
 For more information on these negotiations, see Future of the IWC, INT‘L WHALING COMM‘N, 
http://iwcoffice.org/commission/future.htm (last updated June 15, 2010). 
9
 ICRW, supra note 7, pmbl. 
10
 Id. art. III, para. 1. 
11
 See id. art. V. 
12
 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
ratified the Whaling Convention,
13
 the EU is not a party to the Treaty. As will be 
discussed later, Iceland left the Whaling Convention in 1992 but rejoined in 2002 and 
remains a party to the Treaty. 
The IWC may amend the Schedule either by consensus or, in its absence, by a 
three-quarters majority of those Commissioners voting
14
 in order to fix: 
 
(a) protected and unprotected species; 
(b) open and closed seasons; 
(c) open and closed waters, including the designation of sanctuary areas; 
(d) size limits for each species; 
(e) time, methods and intensity of whaling (including the maximum catch of 
whales to be taken in any one season); 
(f) types and specifications of gear and apparatus and appliances which may be 
used; 
(g) methods of measurement; and  
(h) catch returns and other statistical and biological records.15 
 
After years of ineffective management of the resource,
16
 in 1982, the IWC voted 
to amend the Schedule in the following terms:   
 
[C]atch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all 
stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter 
shall be zero.  This provision will be kept under review, based upon the 
best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will 
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on 
whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the 
establishment of other catch limits.
17
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293; Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on 
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
13
 See ICRW, supra note 7, pmbl. (only two EU member states are not party to the Whaling Convention: 
Latvia and Malta). 
14
 Id. art. III, para. 2. 
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 Id. art. V, para. 1. 
16
 Originally the IWC utilized the blue whale unit to regulate the industry. Catch limits were established for 
a season by taking into account the volume of oil a given species was thought to produce—a blue whale 
unit represented a single blue whale or, for example, two fin whales or six sei whales. This led to the 
decimation of stocks of the larger whales in particular—blue whales were, for instance, highly prized by 
whalers as a rich source of oil. The massive over-exploitation of the whale resource led to calls at the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 for a ten-year whaling moratorium to allow 
stocks to recover. Although this suggestion was not acted upon by the IWC at that time, the decision was 
made that same year to discard the blue whale unit and to adopt the new management procedure (NMP). 
The NMP was a more sophisticated system that enabled species to be divided into geographical stocks and 
rated as an initial management stock, sustained management stock, or protection stock. If rated as a 
protection stock, no commercial whaling of such stock was allowed. The NMP attempted to facilitate the 
exploitation of whales, but only on a sustainable basis. A key weakness of the new system was that it was 
dependent on accurate whale population data, which was largely not forthcoming. 
17
 ICRW, supra note 7, sched., sec. III, para. 10(e). 
As such, a moratorium on commercial whaling became effective with the 1986 coastal 
and 1985/86 pelagic whaling seasons, and commercial catch quotas in the Schedule have 
remained set at zero to the present day.
18
 The 1982 amendment to the Schedule 
introducing the moratorium indicated that a ―comprehensive assessment of the effects of 
this decision on whale stocks‖19 was to be made. The IWC‘s Scientific Committee has 
been actively involved in this assessment. The need for such a study underlined the poor 
quality of data on cetacean populations at that time.  
In recent decades, much of the debate within the IWC has been deeply polarized 
between those states that have generally adopted a protectionist stance seeking to 
conserve cetaceans (for example, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States), and, on the other hand, those pro-whaling countries that argue that the 
time has come to lift the commercial whaling moratorium by allowing quotas to be set for 
those whale stocks that, in their view, can now be sustainably harvested (Iceland, Japan, 
and Norway).  
Importantly, any amendment to the Schedule can lead to the lodging of an 
objection by a party within ninety days of notification of adoption by the IWC.
20
 An 
objection has a similar impact as a legal reservation; the objected measure is avoided by 
the objecting state, and the state will therefore not be bound by the measure under 
international law. Four states lodged objections to the moratorium: Japan, Norway, Peru, 
and the USSR. Japan, under particular political pressure from the United States,
21
 and 
Peru have subsequently withdrawn their objections and must therefore now respect the 
moratorium. However, neither Norway nor Russia have withdrawn their objections and, 
in essence, may engage in commercial whaling. Russia has opted not to do so, but 
Norway recommenced commercial whaling in 1993, taking the view that the northeastern 
Atlantic minke whale stock is not threatened with extinction and can be sustainably 
harvested.
22
 Iceland has shared this view. Norway has continued to whale commercially 
since 1993, ignoring several calls by the IWC to bring its operations to a close.
23
  
Iceland chose not to lodge an objection to the moratorium and, in late 1991, 
indicated that it was withdrawing from the IWC with effect from June 30, 1992.  Iceland 
had become frustrated with what it perceived as a lack of progress within the IWC on the 
re-introduction of commercial whaling, particularly bearing in mind that the amendment 
                                                 
18
 Catch quotas have continued to be established for aboriginal whaling. Traditionally, small takes of 
whales have been allowed for subsistence purposes, including local consumption in meeting nutritional, 
subsistence, and cultural needs. In recent years, the IWC has endorsed proposals for such catches in 
Greenland (generally fin and minke whales), the Russian Federation (gray and bowhead whales), St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (humpback), and the United States (bowhead and gray whales). See generally 
Jeremy Firestone & Jonathan Lilley, Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling and the Right to Practice and 
Revitalize Cultural Traditions and Customs, 8 J. INT‘L WILDLIFE L. & POL‘Y 177 (2005). 
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 ICRW, supra note 7, sched., sec. III, para. 10(e). 
20
 Id. art. V, para. 3. 
21
 See Charles L. Johnson, Environmental Law: Certification of Japanese Violations of International 
Whaling Agreements, 29 HARV. INT‘L. L.J. 541 (1988). 
22
 Int‘l Whaling Comm‘n [IWC], Chairman’s Report of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting, 47  REP. INT‘L 
WHALING COMMISSION 17, 30 (1996) (Endorsed by the IWC‘s Scientific Committee in 1996, abundance 
approximations estimated that the northeastern Atlantic minke whale population in 1989 was more than 
67,000 and increased to over 118,000 in 1995).  
23
 See, e.g., IWC, Resolution on Commercial Whaling, Resolution 2001-5 (2001), available at 
http://iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/resolution2001.htm. 
to the Schedule introducing the moratorium had stipulated that by ―1990 at the latest‖24 
the IWC was to have undertaken an assessment of the impact of the ban and 
―consider[ed] modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch 
limits.‖25 Icelandic proposals for what it considered to be sustainable catch quotas in 
1990 and 1991 having been rejected by the IWC, the Icelandic Fisheries Minister, 
commenting on Iceland‘s decision to withdraw from the Whaling Convention, indicated 
as follows: 
 
The economic and social fabric of this island nation [is] overwhelmingly 
dependent on the health and productivity of the surrounding marine 
environment. Whales have an important ecological role in the Icelandic 
Exclusive Economic Zone; they consume more than the amount of 
seafood that our fishermen harvest. Whales must, therefore, be treated in 
the same manner as other resources, subject to the same management 
principles. . . . It should not be difficult to understand why this 
Government must respond to the grim reality that the International 
Whaling Commission is no longer a viable forum for international 
cooperation on the conservation and management of the whale populations 
in our region. It is clear that Iceland has no choice but to seek cooperation 
in this field through the establishment of a new organization for the North 
Atlantic.
26
  
 
Iceland subsequently became a founding member of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission (NAMMCO), which was established by the 1992 Agreement on 
Cooperation on Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the 
North Atlantic.
27
 Signed by those ministers responsible for fisheries management in the 
Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, and Norway, this Treaty aims to ―contribute through 
regional consultation and cooperation to the conservation, rational management, and 
study of marine mammals in the North Atlantic‖28 and, in particular, endorses the 
sustainable utilization of cetaceans in the North Atlantic.  
While its fellow pro-whaling nations, Japan and Norway, remained in the IWC 
arguing their case for the introduction of sustainable whaling, Iceland took the dramatic 
step to disengage completely from the Whaling Convention and instead to cooperate with 
other like-minded parties within NAMMCO. However, such withdrawal diminished 
Iceland‘s international voice and, in doing so, reduced the potential impact of the pro-
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 ICRW, supra note 7, sched., para. 10(e).  
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 Press Release, Ministry of Fisheries, Iceland, Government of Iceland Announces Withdrawal 
from the International Whaling Commission (Dec. 27, 1991), available at http://www.highnorth.no/ 
Library/Policies/National/go-of-ic.htm. 
27
 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the 
North Atlantic, Apr. 9, 1992, 1945 U.N.T.S. 3; see N. ATL. MARINE MAMMAL COMM‘N, www.nammco.no 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2011); see also David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the 
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 
89 AM. J. INT‘L L. 154, 163 (1995). 
28
 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the 
North Atlantic, art. 2, Apr. 9, 1992, 1945 U.N.T.S. 3. 
whaling lobby at the international level. As a consequence, in June 2001, Iceland 
attempted to rejoin the IWC. Contentiously, Iceland‘s 2001 re-adherence instrument 
included a reservation to the amendment of the Schedule that introduced the commercial 
whaling moratorium. Iceland had not objected to the modification to the Schedule 
introducing the moratorium in 1982 and could no longer do so because any objection had 
to be made within ninety days of the modification‘s notification. Instead, Iceland opted to 
register a reservation that it hoped would avoid the impact of the moratorium and protect 
it should it decide at any point in the future to resurrect its commercial whaling 
operations.   
At its fifty-third meeting held in London in July 2001, the IWC refused to accept 
Iceland‘s reservation. Nineteen commissioners voted for such a refusal and three 
abstained. No votes were cast against the motion, but sixteen Commissioners refused to 
participate at all, taking the view that the IWC did not enjoy competence to rule on the 
legitimacy of Iceland‘s reservation. In a subsequent vote, the IWC deemed that Iceland 
would only enjoy observer status at the meeting. However, the issue of Iceland‘s 
membership and reservation reappeared again at the fifty-fourth IWC meeting held in 
Shimonoseki, Japan following Iceland‘s registration of another adherence instrument 
together with an identical reservation in May 2002. At Shimonoseki, the IWC voted in 
favor of a proposal to uphold the IWC chair‘s decision taken earlier at the meeting that 
the chair was obligated to uphold the July 2001 IWC decision not to accept Iceland‘s 
reservation (by a vote of twenty-five to twenty).  
Iceland nevertheless persisted in its ambition to re-adhere to the IWC; it registered 
another adherence instrument together with a similarly worded reservation on October 
10, 2002. This attempt to rejoin the IWC was the subject of a special IWC meeting held 
four days later in Cambridge, United Kingdom, at which the IWC voted in favor of a 
proposal that the Chairman was, in fact, not bound by the previous 2001 IWC decisions 
(by a vote of nineteen for to eighteen against).
29
 Iceland had in effect succeeded in re-
establishing itself as a member of the IWC with a reservation against the moratorium and, 
as such, has since asserted that the commercial whaling moratorium is inapplicable as far 
as it is concerned.
30
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 Controversially, Iceland was allowed to vote in favor of this motion. 
30
 Nineteen states, however, have subsequently lodged objections to Iceland‘s reservation; some of these 
states have expressly stated that the reservation is contrary to the object and purpose of the Whaling 
Commission and therefore unacceptable. The Whaling Convention is silent on the power of parties to enter 
reservations. However, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that a state may do 
so unless ―the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.‖ Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, art. 19, subpara. c, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Vienna Convention 
indicates that its provisions apply only ―to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into force 
of the present convention with regard to such States.‖ Id. art. 4. However, the Treaty‘s provisions on 
reservations arguably represent custom and, therefore, apply to the Whaling Convention. See Alexander 
Gillespie, Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 977, 987 
(2003). A detailed assessment of the reserving states‘ arguments and the appropriateness of Iceland‘s 
reservation lie outside the realm of this article, but such an assessment has been the focus of earlier learned 
academic discussion. See generally id. See also IWC, Status of International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling, at 10-14 (2011), available at http://iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/ 
convention_status.pdf [hereinafter ICRW Status] (status of the Whaling Convention and those states that 
have objected to the reservation). 
The reservation stipulated that Iceland would not recommence its commercial 
whaling operations before 2006. Additionally, commercial whaling would not be 
authorized after such time ―while progress is being made in negotiations within the 
International Whaling Commission on the [r]evised [m]anagement [s]cheme.‖31 Part of 
the revised management scheme (RMS)—the revised management procedure (RMP)—
has been agreed upon by the IWC. Rightly described as ―the most conservatory of any 
system currently existing for setting quotas,‖32 the RMP will replace the ineffective new 
management procedure (NMP) and, importantly, takes account of existing uncertainties 
in our knowledge of stock populations and the impact of environmental change on 
cetaceans. However, before the RMP is implemented for commercial whaling, the IWC 
must not only lift the commercial moratorium, but must also reach agreement on the 
entire RMS, of which the RMP forms just one part.
33
 Issues that remain unresolved as to 
the RMS include agreement on an international observer scheme, the funding of an 
international inspector and observer scheme, DNA catch verification, and certain animal 
welfare issues.
34
 In 2006, the IWC acknowledged that an impasse had been reached in 
RMS discussions. Bearing in mind this stalemate, Iceland indicated in late 2006 that it 
would recommence its commercial whaling operations.  
It is important to note that, although Icelandic commercial whaling under its 
reservation began in 2006, Iceland was in fact taking minke whales (Balaenoptera 
acutorostrata) between 2003 and 2007 under special permit.
35
 By virtue of Article VIII, 
paragraph 1 of the Whaling Convention, a party may:  
 
grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to 
kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research…. and the 
killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.
36
  
 
Although parties must report to the IWC on takes under special permit,
37
 it is within the 
remit of the party concerned—and not the IWC—to determine whether to issue such 
permits. However, the Schedule provides that ―proposed permits shall be reviewed and 
commented on by the Scientific Committee at Annual Meetings when possible.‖38 The 
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 ICRW Status, supra note 30, at 10.  The reservation additionally indicates that it ―does not apply, 
however, in case of the so-called moratorium on whaling for commercial purposes, contained in paragraph 
10 (e) of the Schedule, not being lifted within reasonable time after the completion of the Revised 
Management Scheme. Under no circumstances will whaling for commercial purposes be authorized in 
Iceland without a sound scientific basis and an effective management and enforcement scheme.‖  Id. 
32
 PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 726 (3d ed. 2009). 
33
 IWC, Resolution on the Revised Management Scheme, Resolution 1994-5 (1994), available at 
http://iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/IWCRES46_1994.pdf 
34
 See Stuart R. Harrop, From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and the 
International Whaling Commission, 6 J. INT‘L WILDLIFE L. & POL‘Y 79 (2003) (regarding welfare issues).  
35
 Scientific Permit Whaling, IWC, http://iwcoffice.org/conservation/permits.htm (last updated June 22, 
2010).  See generally Alexander Gillespie, Whaling Under a Scientific Auspice: The Ethics of Scientific 
Research Whaling Operations, 3 J. INT‘L WILDLIFE L. & POL‘Y 1 (2000) (discussing ethical issues of using 
animals for scientific research). 
36
 ICRW, supra note 7, art. VIII, para. 1. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id., sched., sec. VI, para. 30. 
IWC has adopted guidelines for its Scientific Committee to enable it to carry out such 
reviews.
39
 Since the adoption of the commercial whaling moratorium, Iceland, Japan, and 
Norway have established research programs at various times utilizing special permits. In 
the last few years, just Iceland and Japan have done so.
40
   
Whaling by special permit has been seen by some anti-whaling nations as simply 
the continuation of commercial whaling operations under a separate guise. In 2003, the 
IWC adopted a resolution on Japan‘s and Iceland‘s research operations that expressed 
“deep concern that the provision permitting special permit whaling enables countries to 
conduct whaling for commercial purposes despite the moratorium on commercial 
whaling.‖41 The resolution went on to reaffirm that ―non-lethal techniques available today 
will usually provide better data at less cost to both animals and budget‖42 and urged ―any 
country conducting or considering the conduct of [s]pecial [p]ermit whaling to terminate 
or not commence such activities and to limit scientific research to non-lethal methods 
only.‖43 In the years between 2003 and 2007, the Icelandic whale research program 
nevertheless involved the taking of some 200 minke whales. The original Icelandic 
special permit proposal had also envisaged the taking of fin (Balaenoptera physalus) and 
sei (Balaenoptera borealis) whales, but Iceland has yet to make a formal decision to 
commence this element of its research. In 2010, the total whales Iceland caught 
commercially amounted to 59 minke whales and 142 fin whales.
44
 All Icelandic whaling 
since 2003 has taken place within Iceland‘s territorial sea or exclusive economic zone.45  
 
The EU and Recent Developments within the IWC 
 
Intended to resolve issues that have polarized much of the debate within the IWC 
in recent years, discussions began on the future of the IWC
46
 after the 2007 IWC 
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 See IWC, Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit, Resolution 1995-9 (1995), available at 
http://iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/IWCRES47_1995.pdf. In 2009, the IWC adopted a new 
procedure for reviewing new permit proposals that includes the establishment of a specialist workshop to 
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 Scientific Permit Whaling, supra note 35; see Keiko Hirata, Why Japan Supports Whaling, 8 J. INT‘L 
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 Id. Australian displeasure at Japan‘s continued special permit program in Antarctica led it to commence 
proceedings in May 2010 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Whaling in the Antarctic 
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 GISLI VIKINGSSON, ICELAND. PROGRESS REPORT ON CETACEAN RESEARCH, MAY 2010 TO APRIL 2011, 
WITH STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 2010 sec. 6.2 (2011), available at http://iwcoffice.org/ 
_documents/sci_com/2011progreports/SC-63-ProgRepIceland.pdf. 
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 E-mail from Gisli Vikingsson, Marine Research Institute, Reykjavik, Iceland, to Author (Sept. 29, 2011, 
09:59 GMT) (on file with author). 
46
 See Future of the IWC, supra note 8. 
meeting. The Small Working Group on the Future of the IWC
47
 was set up in 2008 with a 
view to reaching a consensus on a range of matters including divisive issues such as 
whaling under special permit, the continuing moratorium, and the ability to make 
objections and reservations. Following these discussions, the Proposed Consensus 
Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales
 48
 was circulated by the IWC‘s chair and 
vice-chair in April 2010 for discussion at the June 2010 sixty-second IWC meeting. Key 
components of the draft decision would have kept the commercial whaling moratorium in 
place, suspended for ten years all ―unilaterally-determined whaling under special permit, 
objections, and reservations,‖ and brought ―all whaling authorized by member 
governments under the control of the IWC.‖49 Additionally, whaling would have been 
limited to only those countries that ―currently take whales‖ and ―establish caps for the 
next ten years that are significantly less than current catches and within sustainable 
levels, determined using the best available scientific advice.‖50 Consensus on this draft 
decision could not, however, be reached at the 2010 IWC meeting, and it was agreed that 
further work should be paused to allow time for reflection before the next IWC meeting 
in 2011. 
At the time of the 2010 IWC meeting, Spain held the presidency of the EU and 
therefore spoke on behalf of the EU and its member states in its opening statement.
51
 
Although agreeing with some of the draft decision, Spain highlighted twelve points that 
needed to be addressed as far as the EU was concerned. Of particular interest to this 
article, the draft decision would have allowed IWC-endorsed quotas to be set for those 
states currently whaling, and the EU was unhappy with the catch limits envisaged for the 
Northern Hemisphere. The EU‘s position advocated ―reduced catch limits that would 
guarantee a significant improvement in the conservation of whales in the long term, 
moving towards the final goal to ban the whaling activities which are not in line with the 
moratorium on commercial whaling within an agreed time frame.‖52   
The EU‘s political negotiating stance at the international level is that commercial 
whaling should cease in a given period of time. Against this backdrop, this article will 
now provide an analysis of the applicable EU legal measures currently in place and the 
extent to which, if at all, continued Icelandic whaling could legitimately continue under 
EU environmental law should Iceland accede to the EU. 
 
Icelandic Whaling and EU Environmental Law 
 
This section will first consider the legitimacy of whaling operations by an EU 
member state in light of the terms of the EU‘s Habitats Directive. It will then turn to the 
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application of relevant EU trade-related measures protecting endangered species as they 
relate to whaling. 
 
Application of the Habitats Directive
53
 
 
The Habitats Directive aims to protect biodiversity ―through the conservation of 
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora,‖54 and its measures are designed to ―maintain 
or restore, at favorable conservation status, natural habitats and species of wild fauna and 
flora of community interest.‖55 By affording protection in this way, the Habitats Directive 
seeks—at least in part—to implement the EU‘s obligations not only under the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity,
56
 but also under both the 1979 Convention on the 
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats
57
 and the 1979 Convention on 
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
58
 
While the Habitats Directive has primarily conservation objectives, these 
objectives are not to be pursued to the total exclusion of all other interests as ―measures 
taken pursuant to this Directive shall take account of economic, social and cultural 
requirements and regional and local characteristics.‖59 These other interests are reflected 
in the Directive‘s allowance for member states to derogate from its conservationist 
provisions in certain specified circumstances, which will be addressed later in this article 
in so far as such derogations potentially relate to whaling. As will also be later discussed, 
the Habitats Directive seeks to protect habitats and wild fauna and flora by establishing a 
Europe-wide interrelated network of protected habitat sites imposing obligations of 
maintenance and restoration of habitat (the Natura 2000 network), as well as introducing 
a system of strict protection of fauna and flora that applies to a given member state‘s 
entire territory.  
What is the precise geographical application of the Habitats Directive? The 
directive is designed to ―contribute towards ensuring bio-diversity through the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora in the European territory of 
                                                 
53
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the [m]ember [s]tates to which the Treaty applies.‖60 In the early days of the Habitats 
Directive‘s application,61 it would have been easy to assume that its geographical scope 
only applied to a member state‘s internal waters, land territory, and its adjacent territorial 
seas up to a limit of twelve nautical miles, as only these areas can rightly be regarded as a 
country‘s ―territory‖ under international law.62 Extending the Directive‘s application 
beyond the territorial sea to, for example, the adjacent exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
63
 
would have been met with skepticism given that, although states may enjoy certain 
sovereign rights therein, such maritime zones could never be regarded as national 
territory under international law.
64
 However, the ruling of the English High Court in R. v. 
Secretary of State for Trade & Industry ex parte Greenpeace Ltd.
65
 on November 5, 1999 
has been highly influential in denoting a wider geographical scope of the measure. The 
United Kingdom (U.K.) government had argued that it could legally carry out its 
licensing functions for oil exploration without reference to the Habitats Directive because 
the measure was only applicable within its sovereign territory, which included its twelve-
mile territorial sea. Greenpeace, however, disagreed with this view and sought judicial 
review of the Secretary of State‘s decision that licenses would be granted to oil 
companies to search and bore for oil in the northeast Atlantic, specifically in an area that 
forms part of the U.K.‘s continental shelf and its declared economic fishing zone. 
UNCLOS defines the continental shelf in the following terms: 
 
The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where 
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance.
66
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The continental shelf therefore extends beyond the U.K.‘s territorial sea. In the 
continental shelf area, the coastal state exercises ―sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.‖67  
Concerned about the potential impact of the oil companies‘ activities on cetaceans 
and coral forming reefs, Greenpeace claimed that the U.K. government would act 
illegally if it failed to consider the provisions of the Habitats Directive in the licensing 
process. Adopting a purposive approach to the issue of geographical scope, the English 
High Court agreed with Greenpeace in deciding that the Directive did apply to the U.K.‘s 
continental shelf and to the superjacent waters up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
from which the territorial sea is measured. In coming to this conclusion, the High Court 
in particular took into account Greenpeace‘s argument that the aims of the Directive were 
―more likely to be achieved if the geographical scope extends to the continental shelf and 
its superjacent waters.‖68 Subsequent discussion will highlight that all cetaceans are 
afforded protection by the Habitats Directive as they are listed in its Annex IV(a) and are 
known to spend much of their time in waters beyond the confines of territorial seas.  
Furthermore, the coral forming reef, Lophelia pertusa (not specifically noted in the 
Directive, although ―reefs‖ are mentioned in Annex I), is also more likely to be found 
outside the twelve-mile territorial sea limits. The High Court therefore concluded that:  
 
[A] directive which includes in its aims the protection of….lophelia 
pertusa and cetaceans will only achieve those aims, on a purposive 
construction, if it extends beyond territorial waters. Although much of the 
concern of the Directive and some of its language can properly be 
described as "land-based", it also deals specifically with some habitats and 
species which are sea-based and, to a large extent, flourish beyond 
territorial waters.
69
 
 
As such, the U.K. government was unable to legally exercise its offshore licensing 
function without taking into account and applying the provisions of the Habitats 
Directive. In short, the Habitats Directive applied beyond territorial waters to include all 
marine waters within national jurisdiction. 
Importantly, this approach by a national court has subsequently been upheld by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). By virtue of Article 258 of the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission 
performs an enforcement role that gives it sole discretion as to whether to bring 
infringement proceedings before the ECJ against a member state for failure to apply EU 
legislation.
70
 In Commission v. United Kingdom,
71
 the Commission brought such an 
                                                 
67
 Id. art. 77, para. 1. 
68
 R. v. Sec‘y of State for Trade & Indus. ex parte Greenpeace Ltd., [2000] Env. L.R. 221, 231. 
69
 Id. at 242. 
70
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 258, Dec. 13, 2007, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 160 [hereinafter TFEU] (―If the Commission considers that a [m]ember [s]tate has 
failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving 
the [s]tate concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the [s]tate concerned does not comply 
with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union‖). 
Formatted: Font: Italic
action alleging that the U.K. had failed to properly implement the Habitats Directive. 
Among various other issues in contention, the Commission argued that the U.K. had 
improperly limited the scope of its national implementing provisions to national territory 
and U.K. territorial waters, and alleged that “within their exclusive economic zones the 
[m]ember [s]tates have an obligation to comply with Community law in the fields where 
they exercise sovereign powers and that the directive therefore applies beyond territorial 
waters.‖72  
 By the time the issue came to the ECJ, the U.K. and the Commission had in fact 
reached ―common ground . . . that the United Kingdom exercises sovereign rights in its 
exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf and that the Habitats Directive is to 
that extent applicable beyond the [m]ember [s]tates‘ territorial waters.‖73 The ECJ also 
adopted this approach in its ruling that ―the directive must be implemented in that 
exclusive economic zone.‖74 
Having underlined its geographical application, the article will now analyze the 
Habitats Directive to assess the level of protection it affords to cetaceans. Whilst the 
establishment of the Natura 2000 network has been described as the first pillar of 
protection under the Habitats Directive, the species protection system has been referred to 
as the second pillar.
75
 Each of these pillars will now be duly addressed in the context of 
whaling operations. 
 
A. First Pillar - Natura 2000 
 
An important feature of the Habitats Directive is the establishment of the network 
of special areas of conservation known as Natura 2000, which the Commission has 
referred to as ―the cornerstone of Community nature conservation policy.‖76 This 
interlinked coherent ecological network seeks to ensure that the distribution and 
profusion of certain types of natural habitats and species‘ habitats—both marine and 
terrestrial—are either maintained or, if need be, restored at a ―favourable conservation 
status.‖77 Each member state contributes to the Natura 2000 network ―in proportion to the 
representation within its territory of the natural habitat types and the habitats of species‖78 
noted in Annex I and II respectively. Special areas of conservation (SACs) are 
established as particularly important sites that either host natural habitat types noted in 
Annex I or habitats of rare, vulnerable, or endangered species noted in Annex II. The 
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third type of site comprising Natura 2000 is the special protection area (SPA) classified 
under the Wild Birds Directive.
79
  
Annex II of the Habitats Directive is therefore potentially important in the context 
of this article if it includes whales caught by Icelandic operations as the establishment of 
SACs would be envisaged to form part of Natura 2000. Although over eight hundred 
animal and plant species are listed in Annex II and are therefore deemed in need of 
protection because they are endangered, vulnerable, or rare, only two cetaceans are 
included in this annex: Phocoena phocoena (harbor porpoise) and Tursiops truncatus 
(common bottlenose dolphin).
 80
 These cetaceans are not the subject of Icelandic whaling 
operations. Instead, we must turn attention to the second pillar—the species system of 
protection—to assess the manner in which cetaceans harvested by Icelandic whalers are 
afforded protection. 
 
B. Second Pillar - Species Protection 
 
Member states must establish a system of protection under the Habitats Directive 
for animal species listed in Annex IV(a) and plant species in Annex IV(b).  There are 
currently more than nine hundred animal and plant species in Annex IV. In the whaling 
context, it is important to stress that all species of cetaceans are noted in Annex IV(a).  
By virtue of Article 12(1),
81
 the following actions are prohibited in relation to Annex 
IV(a) animal species: 
 
(a) all forms of deliberate capture or killing of specimens of these species 
in the wild; 
(b) deliberate disturbance of these species, particularly during the period 
of breeding, rearing, hibernation, and migration; 
(c) deliberate destruction or taking of eggs from the wild; 
(d) deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places.82 
 
The case of Commission v. Hellenic Republic provides an example of an 
infringement action brought against a member state by the Commission alleging a failure 
to establish and implement an effective system of protection for a species noted in Annex 
IV(a).
83
 The loggerhead sea turtle (Caretta caretta) produces offspring only every two or 
three years, at which time each turtle crawls onto the beach and lays approximately 120 
eggs. Two months later, the baby turtles are born and are at their most vulnerable. Tipped 
off by environmental nongovernmental organizations, Commission officials visiting the 
Greek island of Zakinthos identified the presence of mopeds on beaches used as breeding 
sites, as well as the presence of small boats near breeding beaches. In finding against 
Greece, the ECJ declared that the use of these modes of transport in this sensitive area 
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constituted ―deliberate disturbance‖ during the turtles‘ breeding period. Moreover, the 
erection of illegal buildings on the breeding beaches was deemed liable to lead to the 
deterioration or destruction of the turtles‘ breeding sites. Greece had failed in its 
obligations to ensure a system of strict protection for the loggerhead turtle in accordance 
with Article 12.
84
 
As noted earlier, it has been established by case law that the terms of the Habitats 
Directive apply to a member state‘s declared EEZ. As all Icelandic whaling since 2003 
has been located within its territorial sea or EEZ, such operations would fall within the 
remit of the Habitats Directive should Iceland accede to the EU. The particular provisions 
of Article 12(1) that would seemingly prohibit Icelandic whaling within its territorial 
waters and its declared EEZ are the prohibitions on ―all forms of deliberate capture or 
killing of specimens of these species in the wild‖ and any ―deliberate disturbance of these 
species.‖85 In the absence of national Icelandic laws capable of affording such protection, 
Iceland would be in breach of its legal obligations if it became an EU member state. 
Furthermore, even if such an Icelandic national protective legal framework existed, an 
Icelandic omission to enforce these protective laws would constitute a separate breach of 
its obligations.
86
  
In addition to the prohibitions under Article 12(1), member states are obliged to 
take measures to ban the ―keeping, transport, and sale or exchange, and offering for sale 
or exchange, of specimens taken from the wild‖ of Annex IV(a) species by virtue of 
Article 12(2). A ―specimen‖ is defined as ―any animal or plant, whether alive or dead, of 
the species listed in Annex IV‖ and ―any part or derivative thereof.‖87 In effect, if Iceland 
were an EU member state, the offer, sale, and transportation of whale meat would be 
banned. This point is important considering that whale meat has been sold in Iceland in 
recent years and that Iceland has sold and transported whale meat to Japan since 
recommencing commercial whaling.
88
   
In accession negotiations, Iceland may request that an amendment be made to the 
Habitats Directive removing cetaceans from Annex IV(a). Transitional measures may 
also be requested in these negotiations, as the applicable accession negotiating framework 
notes: ―The Union may agree to requests from Iceland for transitional measures provided 
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they are limited in time and scope, and accompanied by a plan with clearly defined stages 
for application of the acquis.‖89 Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that the twenty-seven 
existing EU member states would grant a request either to amend the Habitats Directive 
or to apply transitional measures delaying the application of the Habitats Directive in 
relation to whaling. Indeed, Norway applied to join the European Community (now the 
EU) in 1992 and subsequently held accession negotiations with the European 
Community. By 1993, Norway had recommenced commercial whaling by utilizing its 
objection under the Whaling Convention. Even so, no amendments to the Habitats 
Directive were made in the draft Accession Treaty nor were transitional measures agreed 
to despite Norway‘s wish to continue its commercial whaling operations. In late 1994, the 
Norwegian public voted on the Accession Treaty and decided not to join the European 
Community. 
  It is, however, very important to stress that the Habitats Directive itself allows 
member states to derogate from the provisions of Article 12(1) and (2). Indeed, 4718 
derogations were issued by member states in 2005-2006.
90
 This ability to derogate is 
intended to provide some balance to the Directive‘s environmental objectives by allowing 
other interests to be taken into account in carefully defined circumstances. Before 
assessing the ability to derogate in the context of Icelandic whaling, a few general points 
need to be made about derogations under the Habitats Directive. Member states are 
allowed to derogate without consulting with the Commission beforehand,
91
 but must 
report to the Commission on these derogations every two years.
92
 The Commission is 
then tasked with assessing the appropriateness of derogations and can ultimately 
commence an infringement action before the ECJ should it feel that a member state has 
made an unwarranted derogation.  
Provided that there is ―no satisfactory alternative and the derogation is not 
detrimental to the maintenance of the populations of species concerned at a favourable 
conservation status,‖ member states can derogate, but only if one or more additional 
conditions apply.
93
 Of those conditions, the following might arguably cover whaling 
operations:
94
 
 
 ―in the interests of public health and public safety, or for other 
imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a 
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social or economic nature and beneficial consequences of primary 
importance for the environment;‖95 
 ―for the purposes of research and education, of repopulating and re-
introducing these species and for the breeding operations necessary for 
these purposes, including the artificial propagation of plants;‖96 and 
 ―to prevent serious damage, in particular to crops, livestock, forests, 
fisheries and water and other types of property.‖97  
 
Each of these potential derogations will now be assessed with specific reference to 
Icelandic whaling operations.
98
 In doing so, it is important to stress that the ECJ has ruled 
that ―Article 16 of the Habitats Directive defines in a precise manner the circumstances in 
which [m]ember [s]tates may derogate from Article[] 12 . . . so that Article 16 must be 
interpreted restrictively.‖99 Furthermore, any killing of an Annex IV(a) animal under 
derogation would necessitate the relevant competent authority in the member state in 
question ―proving that the necessary conditions are present for each derogation.‖100 
 
1. For other imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a 
social or economic nature 
 
The world financial crisis was a key reason behind Iceland‘s 2009 application to 
join the EU as it is envisaged that membership in the organization would have a 
potentially stabilizing impact upon Iceland‘s economy. The Commission, in February 
2010, indicated that ―the last two years have been challenging for Iceland. In the context 
of global financial crisis, its banking system collapsed in October 2008 with severe 
economic impact and social consequences.‖101 Indeed, the country‘s gross domestic 
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product dramatically fell from 47,700 euros per capita in 2007 to 32,100 euros in 2008.
102
 
With a population of over 300,000,
103
 Iceland experienced an average unemployment rate 
of 3.2% between 1993 and 2002, but this rate rose to 8.0% in 2009 and 8.1% in 2010.
104
 
Whilst International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections place the 2012 rate at 6.5%,
105
 
Iceland is presently in economic difficulties and may wish to apply this derogation by 
highlighting the raised levels of unemployment and economic distress since 2008. In 
March 2010, the Institute of Economic Studies at the University of Iceland produced a 
report analyzing the effects of whaling around Iceland.
106
 The report indicates that in 
1973-1985, when the Icelandic company Hvalur Ltd. commercially whaled, the value of 
whale processing amounted to 0.7% of gross domestic product on average.
107
 
Furthermore, it estimates that if 150 fin and 150 minke whales were caught each year, 
they could provide around 80-90 jobs.
108
 
However, if Iceland attempted to derogate for social or economic reasons, it 
would also have to be sure that there were no ―satisfactory alternatives.‖ Expanding the 
whale watching industry would arguably provide such an alternative.
109
 Ten whale 
watching companies operated in Iceland in 2010, and the largest four companies 
employed approximately 120 people at the height of the season.
110
 It is estimated that the 
numbers of tourists participating in whale watching trips in Iceland has risen from 61,000 
in 2000 to 125,000 in 2009.
111
 The burgeoning Icelandic whale watching industry has 
allowed fisherman forced to leave the fisheries industry due to pressures on fish stocks to 
gain new employment.
112
 The reintroduction of the whaling industry in Iceland has at 
times led to conflict with the newly established whale watching industry; for example, in 
May 2011, it was reported that whalers had processed a minke whale within a no-hunt 
zone established by the Icelandic government to exclude whaling operations near areas 
reserved for whale watching.
113
 A cessation of whaling may provide a boost to the whale 
watching industry with more tourists prepared to visit Iceland for whale watching 
opportunities. 
It will be recalled that a member state would also have to provide evidence that 
any derogation is not detrimental to the maintenance of the species at a favorable 
conservation status. In essence, favorable conservation status is a ―necessary 
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precondition‖ for a valid derogation.114 ―Conservation status‖ and ―favourable 
conservation status‖ are defined in Article 1(i) of the Habitats Directive as follows: 
 
[C]onservation status of a species means the sum of the influences acting 
on the species concerned that may affect the long-term distribution and 
abundance of its populations within the territory referred to in Article 2; 
The conservation status will be taken as ―favourable‖ when: 
 population dynamics data on the species concerned indicate that it is 
maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its 
natural habitats, and 
 the natural range of the species is neither being reduced nor is likely to 
be reduced for the foreseeable future, and 
 there is, and will probably continue to be, a sufficiently large habitat to 
maintain its populations on a long-term basis.
115
   
 
The Commission has subsequently noted that a favorable conservation status is, 
―roughly speaking, . . . a situation where species populations are doing well with good 
prospects for the future.‖116  In this respect, it is noteworthy that the fin whale currently 
has ―endangered‖ status on the International Union for Conservation of Nature‘s 
(IUCN) red list.
117
 This listing is, however, a global rather than a regional one,
118
 and 
―when the area west and southwest of Iceland was singled out, a significant increasing 
trend was found.‖119 A 2001 estimate placed the population around Iceland at 25,800, a 
figure agreed to by the IWC‘s Scientific Committee in 2006.120 Iceland‘s Marine 
Research Institute takes the view that a catch of 154 fin whales per year is ―sustainable 
and precautionary for the calendar years 2011-2012.‖121 Globally, the status of 
common minke whales is rated as a species of ―least concern‖ on the IUCN red list.122 
A 2001 estimate placed the population around Iceland at around 43,600, an estimate 
agreed to by the IWC‘s Scientific Committee in 2003.123 Iceland‘s Marine Research 
Institute has indicated that ―the minke whale stock around Iceland is considered to be 
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close to pre-exploitation abundance,‖ but that annual catch should not be more than 
216 in 2011 and 2012.
124
 
There is perhaps an arguable case that a derogation is needed for ―imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature,‖ 
and that the killing of a limited number of minke and fin whales would not be 
detrimental to the maintenance of the species at a favorable conservation status. 
However, this argument is likely to be supportable only in the medium term as the 
Icelandic economy recovers over the next few years.
125
 Moreover, all of the necessary 
conditions in Article 16 must be proven, and the Commission and the ECJ may well 
conclude that, for example, there are satisfactory alternatives to this derogation, 
especially when one takes into account that the grounds for derogation are to be 
interpreted restrictively. Should this be the case, any attempt to derogate under Article 
16(1)(c) would be invalid. 
 
2. To prevent serious damage, in particular to . . . fisheries 
 
Iceland may wish to argue that whales consume too many fish and thereby reduce 
the catch for the fishing industry.
126
 The Institute of Economic Studies at the University 
of Iceland has estimated that fishing for capelin, cod, and haddock could be significantly 
expanded if Iceland was to hunt 150 fin and 150 minke whales every year.
127
 It is 
estimated that the capelin catch would increase by 13,800 tons, cod by 2200 tons, and 
haddock by 4900 tons.
128
  
However, a member state utilizing this derogation must clearly establish that 
hunting would prevent ―serious damage‖ to fisheries.  In the absence of clear and 
accepted evidence confirming that hunting would prevent such damage, the ECJ is likely 
to rule against the derogation.  For example, in Commission v. Finland, the Commission 
alleged that Finland infringed the Habitats Directive by incorrectly issuing permits for the 
hunting of wolf (Canis lupus), a protected Annex IV(a) species, in order to prevent 
―serious damage.‖129 In its deliberations, the court noted as follows: 
 
Although it cannot be automatically ruled out that authorizing the killing 
of one or several wolves in a pack certain of whose members cause or are 
likely to cause such damage may prevent, eliminate or reduce that 
damage, it must be stated that the information on the file is not capable of 
confirming that hypothesis. In that regard . . . certain parties are of the 
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opinion that continued hunting keeps wolves wary of humans and thus 
helps to reduce damage, while others consider that hunting of wolves 
which belong to packs only increases damage. Furthermore, it is stated 
that little biological research on this topic is available. In those 
circumstances, the Commission‘s complaint relating to the fact that 
hunting permits are issued on a preventive basis must be upheld.
130
  
The findings by the Institute of Economic Studies at the University of Iceland referred to 
above, which indicate that whales have a negative impact on the status of commercial 
fish stocks, have been criticized on the grounds that the model utilized in the analysis is 
too simplistic and fails to take into account so-called ―beneficial predation‖ that occurs 
when cetaceans consume those fish species that would otherwise feed on cod and other 
commercially exploitable stocks.
131
 For these reasons, it would be difficult to prove 
conclusively the need for the derogation before the ECJ regardless of the other conditions 
that would need to be satisfied as to whether there is a satisfactory alternative to the 
derogation or whether the derogation is not detrimental to the maintenance of the fin and 
minke whale populations around Iceland at a favorable conservation status. 
 
3. For the purposes of research and education  
 
Although Iceland at the moment has ceased to whale for scientific purposes, from 
2003 to 2007 a scientific research program was operational in relation to the minke. 
Additionally, Iceland had intended to conduct research into the status of fin and sei 
whales and, although this element of its research proposal to the IWC has not yet 
commenced, it is possible that it or a similar program will begin at some point in the 
future. If so, Iceland may wish to utilize this derogation should it by then have joined the 
EU. In this context, it is interesting to note the reaction within the IWC‘s Scientific 
Committee in 2003 when asked to review the Icelandic proposal in relation to minke, fin, 
and sei whales. The proposal‘s aim was to provide information on the ―biology and 
feeding ecology of important cetacean species in Icelandic waters for improved 
management of living resources based on an ecosystem approach.‖132 In this regard, 
Iceland has indicated that, although it carries out research using non-lethal methods, 
―there are some questions that cannot be sufficiently addressed without taking whales‖ 
such as cetacean interaction with the marine ecosystem, as well as age and reproduction 
rates of whale stocks.
133
 In relation to the latter, for example, Iceland‘s Ministry of 
Fisheries and Agriculture has indicated that ―we need to sample earplugs and eye lenses 
for age determination and reproductive organs to determine reproductive status and vital 
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rates. Both of these are impossible to obtain by non-lethal means.‖134 This view was met 
with a mixed reaction within the Scientific Committee in 2003. For example, some on the 
Committee took the view that ―the most reliable‖ source of data required for the purposes 
of the RMP ―could be obtained from genetic analysis, and from genotype-based mark-
recapture data on the movements of individual whales. These analyses are routinely 
conducted using skin tissue derived from biopsy samples and lethal sampling was not 
required.‖135  
Bearing in mind that Article 16 of the Habitats Directive is interpreted restrictively 
and that any derogation requires a member state to prove that the necessary conditions are 
present, it could be argued that, even if the need for some sort of research is proven, the 
lethal manner of such research is not justified when a satisfactory alternative, namely 
non-lethal research, is available. 
 
Application of EU Trade-related Measures Protecting Endangered Species 
 
Attention now turns to the application of relevant EU trade-related measures 
protecting endangered species in the context of whaling. 
 
A. The Protection of Species of Wild Fauna and Flora by Regulating Trade Therein 
(“CITES Regulation”)136 and Commercial Whaling 
 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (―CITES‖)137 entered into force on July 1, 1975. CITES operates by virtue of a 
permit system. All parties to CITES must designate at least one management authority 
with the ability to grant CITES permits and must establish at least one CITES scientific 
authority.
138
 All current EU member states are CITES parties. As the EU is a regional 
organization rather than a state, it cannot become a party to the Treaty.  However, the EU 
would be allowed to do so should the Gaborone amendment to CITES come into force.
139
 
Despite not being a party, the EU fully implemented CITES as long ago as January 
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140
 and currently applies it by reason of the CITES Regulation, which came into 
force in 1997.  
CITES utilizes appendices to differentiate the degree of threat a given species 
faces.
141
 Only CITES Appendix I species are granted the maximum protection under the 
Treaty in that the commercial trade in such species or specimens of such species is, with 
very limited exceptions, prohibited.
142
 However, Article XIV(1)(a) of CITES allows 
parties to adopt ―stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, 
possession or transport of specimens of species‖ included in Appendices I, II, and III, and 
the EU‘s CITES Regulation imposes a number of stricter measures on its member 
states.
143
 Annex A of the EU‘s CITES Regulation, for example, currently includes all 
CITES Appendix I species and some CITES Appendix II and III species. Annex A 
species are afforded the strictest protection under the EU‘s CITES Regulation.  
Whilst only some cetaceans are included in CITES Appendix I,
144
 all cetaceans 
are currently included in the EU‘s CITES Regulation Annex A. Regardless of a species‘ 
status under CITES, any species in Annex A of the CITES Regulation cannot be 
introduced into the EU unless a number of requirements are met.
145
 Crucially, these 
conditions include a management authority of the EU ―[m]ember [s]tate of destination‖ 
issuing an import permit that will not be forthcoming unless it is ―satisfied that the 
specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.‖146 This prohibition 
extends not just to the importation of whales or whale products from a third country, but 
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also to any cetacean brought into EU waters by an EU member state‘s whaling fleet. 
―Introduction from the sea‖ is defined in the CITES Regulation in the following terms: 
 
the introduction into the [EU] of any specimen which was taken in, and is 
being introduced directly from, the marine environment not under the 
jurisdiction of any state. . . .
147
 
Although this definition fails to cover whaling within an EU member states‘ territorial 
waters or EEZ, it does govern the taking of any whales on the high seas that are then 
brought into a member state. As noted earlier, all recent Icelandic whaling operations 
take place within its territorial seas or EEZ, and the CITES Regulation would therefore 
not apply to such activities. But should Iceland ever expand its whaling operations to the 
high seas, such operations would come within the remit of the EU‘s CITES Regulation 
and therefore it deserves consideration. 
It will be recalled that a management authority of the EU ―[m]ember [s]tate of 
destination‖ must issue an import permit that will not be forthcoming unless it is 
―satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.‖ The 
EU‘s CITES Regulation defines a ―[m]ember [s]tate of destination‖ in the context of 
―introduction from the sea‖ as ―a [m]ember [s]tate within whose jurisdiction the place of 
destination of a specimen lies.‖148  Iceland would therefore be the ―[m]ember [s]tate of 
destination‖ in this context since a ―place of destination‖ is defined as ―the place at which 
at the time of introduction into the [EU], it is intended that specimens will normally be 
kept.‖149 In effect, Iceland‘s CITES management authority would need to issue an import 
permit for a harvested whale caught on the high seas (but not within its territorial seas or 
EEZ) and could not do so when the specimen would be used for primarily commercial 
purposes. Any future commercial harvesting of whales by the Icelandic whaling fleet on 
the high seas would fall within this prohibition.  
In addition, the export of any whale meat from an EU member state to a state that 
is party to CITES would require the management authority of the EU state of export to be 
satisfied that a CITES import permit has been issued by the importing state.
150
 No 
exceptions are allowed under the EU‘s CITES Regulation in this respect even if the 
importing non-EU state has a reservation to a CITES listing of a given cetacean. CITES 
stipulates that a required import permit could not be granted unless a management 
authority of the importing country ―is satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for 
primarily commercial purposes.‖151 The export of whale meat from Iceland to Japan 
would therefore be effectively ruled out as such exports are for primarily commercial 
purposes. The domestic purchase and sale of whale products would also be prohibited in 
Iceland regardless of whether the product was obtained from whaling operations that took 
place on the high seas or within waters under national jurisdiction.
152
  However, the 
prohibition on trade in whale products in Iceland (but not the export ban to third 
countries) is likely to be set aside in relation to whale meat from cetaceans caught in 
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Icelandic territorial seas or its EEZ if Iceland makes a legitimate derogation for reasons 
of ―overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature‖ under the 
Habitats Directive.
153
   
These conclusions, however, assume that minke, fin, and sei whales will remain 
on the EU‘s CITES Regulation Annex A. In this regard, future Icelandic membership in 
the EU raises an interesting issue.  Iceland became a party to CITES with effect from 
April 2, 2000 and currently has reservations to the listing on CITES Appendix I of minke, 
sei, and fin whales as well as blue, humpback, sperm, and Northern bottlenose whales. 
The EU‘s CITES Regulation stipulates that its Annex A shall inter alia contain ―species 
listed in Appendix I to [CITES] for which the [m]ember [s]tates have not entered a 
reservation.‖154 The measure further stipulates that Annex B is to contain ―the species 
listed in Appendix I to [CITES] for which a reservation has been entered.‖155  
Let us assume that following its accession negotiations with EU member states 
Iceland still retains its reservations.  Presumably the minke, fin, and sei whales would 
then be regarded as Annex B species due to the reservations. While an import permit to 
introduce a given whale from the high seas into Iceland would still be required from the 
Icelandic CITES management authority, under the CITES Regulation, the issuing of such 
a permit would not be subject to the management authority in question being satisfied 
that the specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.
156
 An import 
permit would not be forthcoming, however, if Iceland‘s CITES scientific authority took 
the view that introduction into the EU would have a ―harmful effect on the conservation 
status of the species . . . taking account of the current or anticipated level of trade.‖157  
This requirement may well be satisfied as far as Iceland‘s CITES scientific authority is 
concerned bearing in mind the Icelandic view that the minke and fin whale populations 
can be sustainably harvested in and around its waters. Furthermore, the export of an 
Annex B specimen from Iceland to a CITES party such as Japan would likely proceed as 
it would not be subject to the requirement that the specimen being exported is not to be 
used for primarily commercial purposes.
158
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Presently, no EU member state has a reservation to the listing of a species on 
CITES Appendix I or II.
159
 The EU has established its own CITES‘ Management 
Committee, Scientific Review Group, and Enforcement Group. These committees 
comprise relevant EU member state representatives and are chaired by the Commission. 
Action is tightly coordinated to ensure uniformity of approach throughout the EU‘s single 
market and would include the making of reservations by member states to the listing of 
specimens on Appendix I or II. Any such reservation would in practice require the 
approval of all EU member states. The issue of Iceland‘s reservations will therefore need 
to be discussed in accession negotiations between Iceland and all twenty-seven EU 
member states. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that, even before these accession 
negotiations began, thirteen EU member states were among an international group that 
called for the withdrawal of Iceland‘s reservations to the listing of whales on CITES 
Appendix I in October 2009.
160
 It therefore appears highly unlikely that Iceland would be 
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 The October 2, 2009 joint demarche, available at http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/ 
joint_demarche_iceland_2009.pdf,  notes as follows: 
 
 We, the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, The 
Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, The United Kingdom, The United States of America and Uruguay, wish to 
express our support for the Government of Iceland‘s decision to review and reassess its 
position on the hunting of whales.  
 
We were deeply disappointed with the former Icelandic Government‘s decision to 
authorise the hunting of fin and minke whales over the next five years on 27 January 
2009. The authorisation was put in place without presentation to the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) and without regard for the long term interests of cetacean 
conservation. We further note that the Icelandic Marine Research Institute recommended 
in June an increased quota of up to 200 fin and 200 minke whales for the 2009/2010 
season and that almost 200 whales have been killed.  
 
We encourage the Government of Iceland to adhere to the internationally agreed 
moratorium on commercial whaling and to re-examine the decision to increase its fin and 
minke whale quota.  
 
Both species are listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Appendix I and we remain extremely 
concerned with Iceland‘s reservation, entered in 2000, for these and other cetacean 
species. We urge Iceland to withdraw this reservation and safeguard these species from 
international trade.  
 
We recognise the conservation efforts made by Iceland in other international agreements 
and hope the Icelandic Government will be able to extend this stance to fully support 
global efforts for cetacean conservation. Furthermore, we would like to draw attention to 
the considerable economic, social and educational benefits of Iceland‘s growing whale 
watching industry and share our strong endorsement of the Icelandic Government‘s plans 
to designate specific ocean areas for whale watching. We hope this action will reinforce 
allowed to retain its reservations in the negotiations. To allow it to do so would in effect 
place the fin, minke, and sei whales on CITES Regulation Annex B and allow 
commercial trade in such species from an EU standpoint.  
 
B. The Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products Regulation and Commercial 
Whaling  
  
Council Regulation 348/81, Common Rules for Imports of Whales or Other 
Cetacean Products (―Imports of Whales or Other Cetacean Products Regulation‖),161 was 
adopted in January 1981 and prohibits, from January 1982, the introduction into the EU 
of a list of whale products listed in its annex if the products are to be used for commercial 
purposes. The products listed in the annex, inter alia, include fresh, chilled, or frozen 
meat, and whalebone.  
A whaling operation that harvests whales in a member state‘s territorial sea would 
not be subject to this measure as the whale would not have been imported into the EU 
since it was caught within the territory of an EU member state. Similarly, any whale 
caught in an EU member state‘s EEZ would likely not be subject to the measure for the 
same reason, although there is no ECJ case law clarifying this particular point. However, 
any whales caught on the high seas and then brought into the jurisdiction (terrestrial or 
marine) of a member state would fall within this measure‘s remit; the dead whale 
comprises meat and whalebone, and they are whale products being imported into the EU. 
As a consequence, the Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products Regulation would 
prohibit the import of whales from any Icelandic high seas whaling operation into the EU 
and into Iceland should it become a part of the EU. This absolute prohibition would apply 
to such activities notwithstanding any, albeit highly unlikely, listing of whales in Annex 
B under the EU‘s CITES Regulation. 
 
C. The CITES Regulation and Whaling under Special Scientific Permit 
 
It is important to reiterate that the CITES Regulation does not apply to current and 
recent whaling as these operations have been restricted to Iceland‘s territorial sea and 
EEZ. However, what if, in the future, Iceland issues special permits to its nationals to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Iceland‘s commitment, as a member of the Support Group, to the future of the IWC 
discussions on the management and conservation of all whale species.  
 
In summary, we support the Icelandic Government‘s decision to reassess its position on 
commercial whaling and once again call upon Iceland to respect the IWC‘s global 
moratorium and end its commercial whaling. 
 
See generally John Vidal, US and EU Countries Officially Condemn Iceland’s Decision on Whale Hunting, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/oct/02/iceland-whaling. 
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take whales from the high seas for research purposes? Assuming, as is likely, that all 
cetaceans remain on CITES Regulation Annex A, Iceland‘s management authority would 
still need to issue an import permit and be satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for 
primarily commercial purposes. ―Primarily commercial purposes‖ is defined by the EU‘s 
CITES Regulation as ―all purposes the non-commercial aspects of which do not clearly 
predominate.‖162 From 2003-2005 Iceland did not sell whale meat from whales caught by 
special permit and indicated that it had no plans to do so in 2006.
163
 If this trend was to 
continue in the context of a future scientific program involving Icelandic whaling on the 
high seas, there would be no doubt that the introduction of whales from the high seas 
under special permit would not be considered to be for purposes of a primarily 
commercial nature. 
However, an import permit still could not be issued unless Iceland‘s scientific 
authority has determined that the introduction into the EU of a specimen ―would not have 
a harmful effect on the conservation status of the species‖164 and is taking place for one 
of a number of stated reasons, which include research ―aimed at the preservation or 
conservation of the species.‖165 Presumably Iceland would be satisfied that any whaling 
under scientific permit of minke or fin whales would meet these conditions and therefore 
whaling under special permit on the high seas could proceed. In making the 
determination that the take of whales in this way satisfies these conditions, Iceland‘s 
scientific authority would need to take note of any opinion of the EU‘s CITES Scientific 
Review Group. However, its obligation is simply to consider rather than to follow any 
such opinion.
166
  
The sale of whale meat inside Iceland (but not the export ban to third countries) is 
arguably also allowed as the CITES Regulation provides an exemption from the 
prohibition of the sale of Annex A specimens if they are ―intended for research or 
education aimed at the preservation or conservation of the species.‖167 Care would have 
to be taken that economic gain from such a sale is not the predominant feature of the 
whaling operation as this would render it subject to the prohibition on trade for 
commercial reasons. However, the potential domestic sale of whale meat in this way 
would be deemed illegal under the Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products 
Regulation as will now be discussed. 
 
D. The Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products Regulation and Whaling under 
Special Scientific Permit 
 
It will be recalled that the Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products 
Regulation prohibits the introduction from the high seas into a member state of a list of 
whale products (including fresh, chilled or frozen meat) if the products are to be used for 
commercial purposes. However, whales caught on the high seas purely for reasons of 
scientific research would be allowed into a member state subject to the production of an 
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import license by the relevant competent, national authority.
168
 Such an import license 
would only be granted when the competent national authority is satisfied that ―the 
products in question are not to be used for commercial purposes.‖169 Any move to sell 
whale meat from cetaceans killed for reasons of scientific research would bring such 
whaling activity within the remit of the prohibition stipulated in the Import of Whales or 
Other Cetacean Products Regulation and therefore render such takes illegal. In the 
absence of such a sale, the Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products Regulation 
would not prohibit the importation into Iceland of whales caught under special permit on 
the high seas. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Accession negotiations with Iceland are ongoing at the time of writing. In time, a 
draft Treaty of Accession will be drawn up, and the Icelandic people will be given an 
opportunity to vote in a referendum on EU membership.
170
 It is important, however, to 
note that Iceland will only be allowed to join the EU if all twenty-seven EU member 
states agree to its membership. The outcome of any negotiation is difficult to forecast, but 
a formal change to applicable EU environmental law or the adoption of a transitional 
period facilitating the continuance of current Icelandic whaling operations is a remote 
possibility. The provisions of the Habitats Directive will therefore apply to the taking of 
whales by Iceland in its territorial seas and EEZ. This measure provides for the protection 
of all cetaceans in these waters and would appear to rule out current Icelandic whaling 
operations. However, Iceland could derogate from the species protection requirements of 
the Habitats Directive, but only in clearly defined and limited circumstances. If it 
successfully derogates, Iceland would be able to continue its current whaling operations 
in its territorial seas and EEZ and to sell whale meat at home (but not abroad due to an 
effective ban on export of whale meat under the CITES Regulation). However, if the 
Commission takes the view that the conditions for derogation have not been satisfied, it 
has the discretion to bring infringement proceedings against Iceland before the ECJ. It 
will then be for the parties to put forward their viewpoints and for the ECJ to make a 
determination. If the ECJ rules against Iceland and Iceland fails to comply with the 
ruling, the matter can be brought back before the ECJ by the Commission whereupon the 
Court can impose a lump sum or penalty payment.
171
 
In relation to the EU‘s CITES Regulation, Iceland will continue to come under 
pressure from EU member states to withdraw its reservations under CITES to the listing 
of certain whales (including the fin, sei, and minke), and all cetaceans will remain on the 
EU‘s CITES Regulation Annex A after the conclusion of accession negotiations. If this 
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submission is correct, Iceland would be unable to carry out a future program to harvest 
whales commercially on the high seas and to land such whales at an Icelandic port under 
the CITES Regulation. The Import of Whales or Other Cetacean Products Regulation 
would also prohibit the importation of whales into the EU from the high seas for 
commercial reasons.  Furthermore, Iceland would be unable to export any whale meat to 
a third country such as Japan under the CITES Regulation. However, if it successfully 
derogates under the Habitats Directive in relation to whales caught within its territorial 
seas or EEZ, the prohibition on the sale of whale meat from cetaceans caught in such 
waters under the CITES Regulation would not apply to sales in Iceland. Whaling under 
special permit on the high seas for reasons of scientific research would likely be 
permitted under both the CITES Regulation and the Import of Whales or Other Cetacean 
Products Regulation, but the latter ensures that the sale of whale meat from such a high 
seas research program must remain unsold.  
The EU favors an end to whaling and seeks to afford a high level of protection to 
all cetaceans primarily under its environmental legislation, but also to an extent under its 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
172
 The incidental catches regulation, for example, was 
adopted in 2004 under the CFP and introduces an independent observer scheme on board 
EU fishing vessels over fifteen meters long to monitor cetacean by-catch.
173
 Any attempt 
by Iceland to continue its whaling operations as an EU member state will be closely 
scrutinized not only by the Commission but also by civil society, particularly 
environmental nongovernmental organizations. The level of scrutiny will make it 
politically very difficult for Iceland to continue whaling. Legally, as this article has 
sought to address, it may not be impossible to whale in EU waters under EU 
environmental law, but significant pressure will be placed on Iceland to justify any 
derogation under the Habitats Directive. The final arbiter may well be the ECJ, which 
will undoubtedly take the view that Article 16 of the Habitats Directive allowing 
derogations must be restrictively interpreted.
174
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